Emphasis on standards of university

Concentration of economic and political power

Brain drain

Rugby divide

Youth clubs

Old people care

Public spending per head

(Copeland, et al., 2014)

* For the past four decades the North of England has persistently had higher all-cause mortality rates than the South of England and the gap has widened over time
* People in the North are consistently found to be less healthy than those in the South across all social classes and amongst men and women
* Whitehead and Doran suggest that this geographical health divide can be explained by social and economic differences, with the North being more deprived than the South
* This paper finds that the longstanding health divide in the UK reduces during a recession as measured by self reported ‘not good health’. Although they also find that the North has consistently greater levels of poor health than the South, even during recessions (those of 1990/91 and 08/09)
* Further research that uses more objective health outcomes (such as mortality data) that could examine the longer term effects would be beneficial

(Moller, et al., 2013)

* This study estimates the impact on mental health problems and limiting long-term illness and mortality in England of current unemployment and a rise in rates of unemployment
* They show that greater unemployment is associated with an increase in premature deaths, mental health problems and limiting long-term illness. This suggests that differential unemployment rates exacerbate geographical health inequalities
* Previous research shows that social protection can mitigate the negative health effects of unemployment
* Lower qualified workers and young people are more strongly affected by unemployment

(Johnston & Pattie, 1989)

* They consider the spatial patterns of voting in the 1979, 1983 and 1987 election and suggest that spatial location, rather than social class, determines your voting preference more than it did before
* The results they present provide clear evidence that over the period 1979-1987 votes in GB have been increasingly influenced by their local environment
* What this suggests is that the changing electoral geography of GB is lined to the changing economic and social geography because people in the relatively prosperous areas are more likely to vote for the incumbent government than those who live in the areas where revival has yet to come (if it ever does). This individuals perceived the national message presented by the parties, relative to their local circumstances

(Duranton & Monastiriotis, 2001)

* Numerous studies have shown that income inequalities across European regions are large and persistent, but while cross-country inequalities have been declining, within country inequalities have been rising in the last 15 years
* There results suggests than when controlling for the composition of the labour force (which job they have), regional inequalities caused by differences in returns to labour market characteristics have decreased significantly, while at the same time the differences in the composition of the labour force have become more accentuated i.e. more experienced workers in higher paying professions are increasingly concentrated in London
* Overall education accounts for 147% of the increase in regional inequalities
* They admit that their analysis only takes place at the regional scale for which the 1980s and 90s have also seen a marked pattern of rising inequalities within regions – this research must be extended for other important issues such as health or the educational attainment of youngsters

(Anyadike-Danes, 2004)

(Blackaby & Manning, 1990)

* The concept of a gulf between a prosperous, high-wage low-unemployment South and a depressed, low-wage, high-unemployment North has a considerable history
* These trends appear inconsistent with neo-classical competitive equilibrium theory which suggests labour and capital flows should eradicate these differentials
* Although actual net regional migration flows are generally in the anticipated direction, they appear insufficient to influence wage and unemployment differentials significantly
* Earnings differ across regions, although part of this is explained by the characteristics of the regional workforce
* The endurance of regional wage and unemployment differentials questions the significance of competitive labour market theory, which predicts their disappearance through actual or potential migration of labour and capital

(Martin, 1988)

* In the 1980s a debate broke out whether the country had become a ‘divided nation’, a society split between rich and poor, between unemployed and the employed, between those communities entrapped in impoverished inner-city areas and those living in comfortable suburbia and ex-urbia, between one nation residing in a depressed ‘north’ and another in a much more prosperous ‘south’
* The debate is not just over the existence or significance of local disparities, which can be found everywhere; the issue is also that these local disparities map out and form part of a broader ‘north-south’ geography of socio-economic inequality, and that this regional divide has become an increasingly prominent feature of British society
* The traditional view of the North-South divide was that emerged during the inter-war and post-war period, while there is also significant evidence that although the North was the manufacturing powerhouse of the UK prior to the war, it still had higher unemployment and lower wages even before the wars due to their inherent vulnerability to the trade-cycle. Meaning that the SE was ahead of the rest of the UK from as early as 1850
* The effect of the economic climacteric of the 1920s and 1920s was to consolidate the dichotomy between the N and the S. The impact was three-fold: in the ‘industrial periphery’ the structural collapse of the coal mining and associated heavy engineering sectors was superimposed on that area’s long-standing slower growth in manufacturing; the heartlands share of national manufacturing employment reached a peak in the 1920s and thereafter started to decline, as a result of a relative deceleration in industrial growth in the NW and York-Humbersie, while the South’s share began to rise sharply as it begand to benefit from the development of the new engineering and consumer goods sectors that the older regions of the ‘industrial north’ proved unable to attract or generate any significant scale sufficient to redress the decline of the 19th C stape industries; the SE’s pre-existing monopoly position as a financial and banking centre emained intact
* Since WW2 the pattern of regional development has had two dominant characteristics: a progressive concentration of economic activity and employment in the S and E and a progressive growth and extension southwards of a relatively depressed North (8)

(Keeble, 1990)

* VAT registration data reveals that recent growth in new and small businesses has been distributed unevenly between regions, and particularly with regard ot the North-South divide
* New growth in numbers of new and surviving businesses (All industries and services) was much greater and faster in Southern than in Northern Birtain
* 60% of the total national increase occurred in South West, East Anglia, Greater LDN and the Rest of the SE, while Scotland, North, Northern Ireland and Wales accounted for only 15% of the national increase, rising to 25% if NW and Yorkshire/Humberside are included